Introduction
The end of apartheid and the introduction of a democratic constitution provided the occasion for taking South Africa's indigenous systems of customary law more seriously. Although early calls to "Africanise" the country's legal system were not heeded, one small concession was made to the country's African legal heritage. For the first time in the history of South African law, a typically African concept was adopted into the general law of the law of the land. This was ubuntu.
In many ways, it has been an exceptional event. Since the colonial conquest of Africa, indigenous customary laws have been treated as inferior, scarcely deserving recognition as true laws. At best, they were tolerated in terms of such monitoring devices as a repugnancy clause. 1 There was, of course, a traffic of ideas between the two systems, but always from the received Roman-Dutch law to customary law.
Although South Africa's new constitutional dispensation had the effect of elevating customary law to the same status as that of the common law, 2 the flow of terms and concepts remained unidirectional. The reception of ubuntu into the common law reversed this process.
This paper concerns the meaning of ubuntu. Much of the discussion in academic circles about the concept has involved a search for its proper meaning, or at least a translation that will render the word comprehensible to a wider audience. The most obvious translations were the calques 3 "humanity", "personhood" or "humaneness",
Notions of participation and reconciliation were reasons for the success of South Africa's constitutional revolution, and a critical institution facilitating this process was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 13 Ubuntu was expressly referred to in the preamble to the Commission's constitutive instrument, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. 14 When discussing the TRC's extraordinary achievements, the Canadian philosopher John Ralston Saul concluded that a strong contributory factor was the outlook of the chair, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who had "very consciously evoked pre-European African concepts such as Ubuntu" to "establish a personal and national sense of justice".
15
One of the primary means for securing a political settlement was the amnesty offered to perpetrators of apartheid offences, provided that they confessed the truth of their deeds.
16
By providing the environment in which victims could tell their own stories in their own languages, the Commission not only helped to uncover existing facts about past abuses, but also assisted in the creation of a narrative truth. In so doing, it also sought to contribute to the process of reconciliation by ensuring that the truth about the past included the validation of the individual subjective experiences of people who had previously been silenced or voiceless.
17
In AZAPO and Others v TRC and Others, 18 however, the applicants argued that the removal of civil and criminal liability was unconstitutional and infringed their right of access to the courts. The Constitutional Court held that the amnesty procedure had been specifically chosen, because without it there would have been no incentive for offenders to disclose the truth and, as the truth unfolded, so would the processes of reconciliation and reconstruction. The Court noted, further, that amnesty was a 13 The TRC "was conceived as part of the bridge-building process designed to help lead the nation away from a deeply divided past to a future founded on the recognition of human rights and democracy". (Truth and Reconciliation Commision Report chap 4, 48).
14 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 15 Saul Equilibrium 94.
16
In AZAPO v TRC 1996 4 SA 562 (C) 570, the Court noted that "the new dispensation requires 'reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society'. In order to achieve this, according to the post-amble, amnesty is required". crucial component of the negotiated settlement itself, without which the Constitution could not have been enacted. As Mahomed DP (as he then was) observed, the TRC sought to "promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past". 
Criminal law
While ubuntu was one of the keys to the political settlement, it has played a more important, long-term role in the criminal justice system. Here, African ideas of dispute resolution had (even earlier) been introduced to a sentencing policy under the label of "restorative justice". This concept was also central to the TRC process: although those who committed crimes of apartheid deserved punishment, peace and national unity dictated reconciliation (which has come to be seen as synonymous with restorative justice).
20
In this sense, ubuntu made its debut in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane. 21 Here the word was given its first full exposition by the courts.
Mokgoro J held that:
Metaphorically, [ubuntu] expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival of communities. While it envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation.
22
Justice Langa continued:
It is a culture, which places some emphasis on communality and on the interdependence of the members of a community. corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.
23
Social harmony lies at the heart of ubuntu and, when applied to criminal justice, it completely upends the common-law system which, generally speaking, aims at retribution. Restorative justice seeks to promote cohesion 24 by inducing reconciliation between the offender, the victim and the community at large, thereby requiring the participation of all interested parties in the proceedings.
25
Restoring social harmony is now one of the central aims of South Africa's sentencing policy. For example, in M v S (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curiae) , 26 which dealt with correctional supervision, the court commended the fact that restorative justice places crime control in the hands of the community rather than criminal justice agencies. As a result, the offender has a better chance of social rehabilitation without suffering the negative effects of a prison sentence, loss of a job and possible destruction of family networks.
27
Reconciliation and restorative justice also feature (predictably perhaps) in the reconfiguration of traditional courts. The Traditional Courts Bill, which was tabled on 9 April 2008, makes much of the need to "affirm the values of the traditional justice system, and to align the goals of restorative justice and reconciliation with the Constitution". 28 The South African Law Commission has also proposed this policy for the community tribunals it recommends be established in the townships.
29
An even more decisive goal of restorative justice appears in the Child Justice Act.
30
In the "Aims" part of this enactment, a declaration is made to "expand and entrench Agency. The Constitutional Court held that, although the act of termination was not in itself unfair, three ancillary issues were: the due compensation; the manner in which the news was publicly communicated; 40 and the general public interest. 41 The Court held that fairness and civility were inseparable from ubuntu. Civility was described as: more than just courtesy or good manners…. It presupposes tolerance for those with whom one disagrees and respect for the dignity of those with whom one is in dispute. In this sense, civility was connected to ubuntu, and was said to be "deeply rooted in traditional culture", and "widely supported as a precondition for the good functioning of contemporary democratic societies".
42
In Hence, the Court said (para 61) that the person concerned would be naturally anxious to know why the declaration was made, especially if it had been based on a misunderstanding or incorrect information. "customer" for the purposes of the public service (especially because the customers have no choice in service provider).
49
Joseph's case concerned termination of the electricity supply to the applicants' residence, because the landlord had failed to pay the bills. The applicants sought reconnection of the electricity, as well as an order that they were entitled to procedural fairness (in the form of notice and an opportunity to make representations to the service provider, City Power). As tenants, however, the applicants had no contractual nexus with City Power. The Court nonetheless held that the company had to comply with the requirement of procedural fairness, 50 since government [must] act in a manner that is responsive, respectful and fair when fulfilling its constitutional and statutory obligations. This is of particular importance in the delivery of public services at the level of local government.
Municipalities are, after all, at the forefront of government interaction with citizens.
51

Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, and Others 52 involved
unfinished business of the TRC, ie a form of amnesty for those who had not participated in the process. To that end the President announced a special pardon for those who had committed politically motivated offences. The question was whether victims were to be given a voice in this special dispensation or not. The
Constitutional Court held that their participation was essential not only in order to establish the truth, but also to achieve the objectives of nation-building and national reconciliation.
53
The notion of participatory democracy is also an African one. Victim participation was the norm in deciding the proper "punishment" for offenders in traditional African society…. this remarkable tradition of participation and Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (hereafter PIE), 63 legislation that aims to address the plight of the homeless and those forced to seek shelter on property owned by another. In order to achieve a just and equitable settlement, the Act requires the courts to consider the lawfulness of the squatters' occupation, their interests and their circumstances, together with broader constitutional values.
Hence, although claims are based on sound legal grounds, they may be refused in order to realise higher norms. These have been variously described as justice, equity, fairness, grace and compassion.
64
The leading case relating to PIE is Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers.
65
In response to a petition signed by 1600 people in the neighbourhood, the Municipality sought an eviction order against 68 people who, for a number of years, had been occupying shacks on privately owned land within the Municipality. Sachs J put the Constitutional Court's approach in the following terms:
PIE expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace and compassion into the formal structures of the law. It is called upon to balance competing interests in a principled way and to promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern.
66
The next few sentences are redolent of the language of ubuntu:
The Constitution and PIE confirm that we are not islands unto ourselves. The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational declaration in our evolving new society of the need for human interdependence, respect and concern.
67 Sachs J then indicated that, while PIE emphasises justice and equity, these values are to be seen as "interactive, complementary and mutually reinforcing" with equality its inherent flexibility, consensus-seeking in family meetings for the prevention and resolution of disputes, the unity of the family structures, the "fostering of cooperation, a sense of responsibility in and of belonging to its members", and "the nurturing of healthy communitarian traditions such as ubuntu". 
Delict
Although the law of delict leaves itself open to ubuntu via such open-ended concepts
as reasonableness, the duty of care, and the largely discretionary process of assessing damages, the concept has had little effect. Mokgoro J held that monetary compensation for defamation diverted attention away from two basic considerations in this aspect of the law: that the reparation represents injury to dignity and reputation, not necessarily to the pocket, and that courts should attempt to re-establish a respectful relationship between the parties. An old remedy of amende honorable (apology) was therefore revived to acknowledge a sense of ubuntu and to emphasise restorative rather than retributive justice.
Contract
Contract, too, has proved resistant to ubuntu, although a possible reception of the concept in this area is a more complex matter. It could well be argued that contract law already has specific mechanisms to deal with the type of problems which ubuntu addresses.
Formerly, one such mechanism was the exceptio doli generalis. This remedy could be invoked as a defence to the enforcement of unfair or unconscionable terms in Another objection claims that the communal ethic of ubuntu denies individual autonomy, and that the "appeal to cohesion privileges dangerous hierarchies [and] corrupt tribal authorities". Because ubuntu is associated with an African tradition it is backward-looking and can have little to offer to the modern world. Drucilla Cornell, however, one of the foremost scholars working on dignity jurisprudence, would contest these objections on the ground that both ubuntu and the related concept of dignity are banners of a high ethical endeavour.
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Whatever the truth of the sceptics' allegations, we need to be aware that we are not bound by a single (or traditional) conception of ubuntu. New meanings have beenand still are being -shaped by courts and writers, and they are concentrating on realising certain values critical to South Africa's changing social order. To this end the courts have emphasised such connotations in ubuntu as civility, respect, dignity, harmony and compassion, as well as compatibility with the Bill of Rights.
Yet another objection to ubuntu is redundancy. See, for example, S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 225: "An outstanding feature of ubuntu in a community sense is the value it puts on life and human dignity. The dominant theme however, must be countered. The Western conception of dignity envisages the individual as the right-bearer, whereas ubuntu sees the individual as embedded in a community. 106 Those exploring dignity jurisprudence in South Africa, would concede that: dignity in Ubuntu thinking is not rooted in reason because of an ethical concern shared with many feminists that this would deny dignity to too many human beings. Thus, such a ground for dignity runs foul of the virtues of inclusiveness and acceptance. Instead dignity is rooted first and foremost in our singularity and uniqueness, and at the same time in our embeddedness as part of a human community. How, then, are we to assess the function of ubuntu in our law? We should be aware that it started life as the product of an oral, not a written, culture. The written word has the effect of objectifying thought. It distances the word from the speaker, thereby facilitating a self-reflective, critical form of analysis characteristic of Western philosophy.
108
Ubuntu, on the other hand, is a lived system of norms. (This should not be taken to imply that it is chaotic, arbitrary or wholly irrational. From what we know of the concept, ubuntu is a coherent and reasoned system.) 109 t is now being used, of the culture is that the life of another person is at least as valuable as one's own. Respect for the dignity of every person is integral to this concept. During violent conflicts and times when violent crime is rife, distraught members of society decry the loss of ubuntu. Thus heinous crimes are the antithesis of ubuntu. Treatment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading is bereft of ubuntu".
106
Cf Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 34, who reply that dignity can be interpreted as "beyond respect in an individualistic sense by incorporating an attitude of communality and inclusiveness: in other words, respect for dignity requires one not only to respect each member of society, but also to behave with dignity in ensuring that every member is given an opportunity to exercise his or her right to dignity to the full". Nevertheless, the authors say (at 33) that, although communalism is not unique to ubuntu, "a feature of Western legal thought is its use of concepts like rationality, reasonableness and equity and a strong emphasis on individualism and on freedom".
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Cornell 2009 www.isthisseattaken.co.za.
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Goodrich Reading the Law 21. The science of jurisprudence is born only when law is written, because written texts facilitate reflection and abstract analysis. Professionalism and jurisprudence then contribute to the development of a "high-register" language for use in legal contexts. This language is marked by differences in vocabulary and structure from the ordinary "low-register" variety. however, in a written legal discourse that is working inexorably to shape its meaning.
What can we now reasonably expect of ubuntu?
The English-law doctrine of equity presents itself as a good indicator. Like equity, ubuntu is functioning as a metanorm to correct injustices resulting from the application of abstract rules of the common law, or even, on occasion, the Bill of Rights. In fact, in Port Elizabeth Municipality Sachs J linked ubuntu to PIE and, through that means, to justice and equity. As a result,
[t]he court is called upon to go beyond its normal functions, and to engage in active judicial management according to equitable principles of an ongoing, stressful and law-governed social process.
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The parallels between ubuntu and equity are compelling. The latter allowed English judges discretion to work out fairer results in particular factual scenarios, thereby serving as a counterweight to inflexible, albeit certain, rules of the common law. 111 In this manner the doctrine of equity was invoked "to regulate the conscience of defendants so that they act [ed] with propriety in situations where, by following the letter of the common law, they could act unconscionably".
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As the latter quote indicates, the history of equity in English law had a close connection with good conscience. In fact, courts of equity were originally presided over by the Lord Chancellor, the chief Minister of the King's Court. 113 As the number of petitions seeking equitable remedies to the Chancellor increased, a separate system of courts was created, known as the Courts of Chancery. He went on to say (para 38) that: "The inherited injustices at the macro level will inevitably make it difficult for the courts to ensure immediate present-day equity at the micro level. The judiciary cannot of itself correct all the systemic unfairness to be found in our society. Yet it can at least soften and minimise the degree of injustice and inequity which the eviction of the weaker parties in conditions of inequality of necessity entails".
Early Chancellors -known as "keepers of the King's conscience" 115 -were clerics, who obviously had a particular knowledge of canon law. 116 Hence, the development of equity in English law owed much to canon law, which drew, in turn, from the principles of natural law, as espoused by St Thomas Aquinas, and even earlier by Greek and Roman philosophy. 117 The origins of equity in religion have a clear resonance with ubuntu, which also finds its ultimate sanction in a spiritual realm: the departed ancestors who stand as guardians of the African moral order.
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As it happened, the English doctrine of equity was not received into South African law. 119 Purists engaged in the bellum juridicum argued that an alien concept such as this would pollute Roman-Dutch law. Aside from which, equity was considered the unique product of a particular judicial system, with no place in our civil-law system, 120 which was already amply equipped with equitable remedies.
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Indeed, several institutions of Roman-Dutch law played the role of equity: unjust enrichment, public policy, good faith, the Bill of Rights (and, formerly, of course, the exceptio doli generalis). The rules of enrichment, for example, were there to correct situations of injustice caused by strict application of the common law. 122 They differed from equity, however, in focusing on the specific enrichment of a defendant before determining whether it was unjust, and offering mainly compensation as opposed to a broader range of equitable remedies.
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Just as the enrichment remedies have a fairly limited role to play in our law, so too do good faith and public policy. These values underlie, first and foremost, the whole idea of adopting a Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in a new legal order. They are central to the coherence of all the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 -where the right to life and the right to respect for and protection of human dignity are embodied in sections 9 and 10 respectively.
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Conclusion
It therefore seems as if the South African courts have a metanorm, similar to equity.
If this is the case, we need to take care that we are not too quick to develop ubuntu in the same manner as equity.
In 1529 the post of the Chancellor was secularised, after which lawyers began to develop equity jurisdiction in the same casuistic manner as the common law.
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When these decisions came to be regarded as binding precedents -a process assisted by publication of the Chancellor's decisions -equity was treated in much the same way as the common law. 130 It became a self-standing system, with its own rules and technicalities. As a result, the doctrine of equity is no longer accepted as a wholly beneficial adjunct to the common law. 132 Although its strength lies in its flexibility and the possibility of achieving justice on a case-by-case basis, 133 equity jurisprudence has hardened into an institution sharing the same inflexibility as its common-law partner. 134 Ironically, it can even result in inequitable outcomes.
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We should, therefore, hesitate before defining ubuntu and circumscribing its area of operation too soon. If we concede that meaning is not fixed in a primordial past, but that it is in the process of being shaped by courts, law-makers and scholars, ubuntu may be allowed free play to provide a new set of values and principles for our law.
These values and principles, however, are distinctively African. It must be remembered that ubuntu is a "loan word" in English, which suggests that it was adopted to signify a phenomenon that was never before expressed in its new environment.
A new word is a solution to a problem. Often the need is obvious, but sometimes it is unseen or barely felt, and then it is only in finding something to plug the gap that we actually realise the gap was there in the first place.
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Ubuntu involves more than entitlements to equal treatment or fair play. It also obliges the individual "to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member of [the] community. More importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all". 
